

"Self-Oriented Monetary Policy, Global Financial Markets and Excess Volatility of International Capital Flows" (R. Banerjee, M. Devereux & G. Lombardi)

A discussion by Aitor Erce (European Stability Mechanism)

DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this presentation are the author's and should not be reported as those of The European Stability Mechanism.

Very timely and relevant issue



[Capital flows volatility] After a sustained period of very accommodative MP worldwide, concerns regarding spill overs from US MP on EMEs are at the forefront

- The Fed tapering talk triggered market turmoil during 2013...
- Do US MP policy create an "externality" in other economies?

[Policy] Given the increased volatility associated with the US MP stance, a debate is ongoing regarding whether, with free capital mobility, flexible exchange rates are sufficient to protect countries from (forthcoming?) external (US) monetary/financial shocks.

- Global cycle ties capital flows dynamics to US MP stance?
- Trilemma versus Dilemma?

The paper in a nutshell – Set-up



Two-region (core & periphery) DSGE.

Core and a periphery engage in production, trade and <u>financial transactions</u>:

- Peripheral residents purchase foreign T-Bill
- Core residents deposit in core (global) banks
- Core banks finance periphery banks who, in turn, finance domestic activity.

Banks face <u>financial frictions</u>: double agency problem. Analyse policy options with and without frictions:

- Debt issuance in core or peripheral currency
- Peripheral exchange rate free-floats or is pegged
- CBs follow Taylor-rule or optimal non-cooperative

The paper in a nutshell – Findings



Findings:

- Effect of monetary shocks depend on policies and frictions
 - Periphery (P) reacts more than Core (C) (accelerator^2)
 - In the absence of frictions, flexible exchange rates work
 - Real effects of shocks stronger if P's CB defends a peg
 - The effect of frictions is ameliorated if P borrows in own currency.
- Non-cooperative optimal MP can protect P

Policy message:

• Financial frictions bring the trilemma for P closer to a dilemma, but MP is not powerless.


The missing "elephant in the room"?



As described (f.i.) in Alberola et al. (forthcoming), EMEs' main war-chest against sudden stops is

INTERNATIONAL RESERVE ACCUMULATION

Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves: Total Holdings and Claims in U.S. Dollars



On exchange rate policy



[What] The paper presents a set of results for the case in which the CB defends a peg

[Doubt] Unclear how this is implemented

[Needed] More detailed balance sheet of the Central Bank is needed

[What] In reality, CBs use international reserves to help them manage their exchange rates

[Needed] Should not you explicitly model reserve accumulation?

On Gross Flows and the NFA



[What] The model delivers gross capital flows retrenchment in line with Broner et al. (2013)

[What] What drives the international investment position behave in this model?

[What] If shock to C, P-residents deposit less abroad and C-banks deliver less credit to P-corporates

[Doubt] How much of the retrenchment is just due to the modelling choice (P-residents save using C T-Bills)?

[Doubt] What would happen if P-residents could deposit at home?

A bit more on Gross Flows...



[Fact] the first of line of defence against capital flows volatility is reserves

[Fact] According to <u>Alberola et al. (forthcoming)</u>, gross flows dynamics during global stress depend on the stock of international reserves (complementarities?)


[Needed] Should not you explicitly model reserve accumulation?

On Core's public debt



[What] C T-Bills are only purchased by P-residents.

[Doubt] The C T-Bills investor base is 100% P-based? Factual?



On Leverage



[Doubt] What is the right level of leverage?

- Some EMEs leverage is similar to the US, others have much larger ratios
- In 2009: US=10.2 vs. China=20.5 or India=14.5
- Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012)

[Doubt] What are the dynamics of leverage?

 LatAm Banks have a constant K ratios. <u>Powell</u> (2015)

[What] How does the model work if frictions only at C banks and/or only at P banks

On the IRFs



Without frictions: C MP shock delivers an increase on public debt in C.
— Is this intuitive/factual?

- With frictions: a variety of outflows dynamics.
 - In some cases capital flight in others domestic retrenchment (see Alberola et al., forthcoming)



To close...

Very nice paper designed to assess policy trade-offs in the presence of a global financial cycle.

- Still, some way to go:
- I miss some more freedom of choice for investors

If the model is about EMEs, I miss a different characterisation of the CB's objectives and instruments (is the Taylor Rule a good characterisation?)


Or is this a model of other advanced managing US MP shocks?



Thank you!!!

Reserves and gross capital flows (Alberola et al., forthcoming)





During global crises, domestic outflows are lower, the larger the country's stock of international reserves

BACK

LatAm Bank capital ratios (Powell, 2015)

